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will modify its order and give him the custody. So far as the
amount of alimony is concerned, we suppose it was intended for
the benefit of the children rather than of the wife. The law does
not intend that a woman unfit to remain the wife shall be supported in idleness by the toil of the ,husband. We however are
not prepared to say that it was exdrbitant, when the custody and
care of the children are taken into the account.
Judgment affirmed.
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ADMIRALTY.

Practice-Review by Supreme Court-Liabilityof Towing-Boats for
Accident.-Though on appeals in admiralty, involving issues of fict
alone, this court will not, except in a clear case, reverse where both the
District and the Circuit Court have agreed in their conclusions, yet in a
clear case it will reverse even in such circumstances: The Lady Pike,
21 Wall.
The master of a steamer which undertakes to tow boats up and down
a river where piers of bridges impede the navigation, is bound to know
the width of his steamers and their tows, and whether, when lashed
together, he can run them safely between piers through which he
attempts to pass. He is bound also, if it is necessary for his safe navigation in the places where he chooses to be, to know how the currents
set about the piers in different heights of the water, and to know
whether, at high water, his steamers and their tows will safely pass over
an obstruction which, in low water, they could not pass over: Id.
The owners of steamers undertaking to tow vessels are responsible
for accidents, the result of want of proper knowledge on the part of
their captains, of the difficulties of navigation in the river in which the
steamers ply: Id.
2 From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter, to appear in vol. 21 of his Reports.
2 From Hon. Edwin B. Smith, Reporter ; to appear in vol. 63 Maine Reports.
3 From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter ; cases decided at February and April
Terms 1875.
4 From John M. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 54 & 55 N. H. Reports.
5 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Penna. Reports.
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ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Irregitdritics not amounting to Fraud.-An award will not be set
aside for slight irregularities in the conduct of the referees, it being apparent that they acted in good faith, and that no injustice was done:
Plummer v. Sanders, 55 N. H.
Where one of three referees, the report of a major part of whom was
to be conclusive, was guilty of fraudulent misconduct in the interest of
one of the parties, and the other two referees in ood faith made an
award in which such referee refused to join, it was held, that the award
would not be set aside at the instance of the party in whose interest the
misconduct had happened: Id.
BAILMENT.

Relinquishment of Possession-Lien.-The voluntary relinquishment,
by the bailee, of possession of the subject of the bailment discharges
his lien, unless it is consistent with the contract, the course of business,
or the intention of the parties, that it should continue : Robinson v.
Larrabee, 63 Me.
When the bailee has parted with his possession, the presumption is
that he has waived or abandoned his lien, unless his conduct, in so
doing, is satisfactorily explained: 1.
The forfeiture of a lien-claim, when once incurred, is not waived by a
subsequent arrangement between the parties, whereby the bailee resumes
the custody of the subject of the bailment, unless such was the intention of the parties: Id.
BANKRUPTCY. See Landlordand Tenant.
Attachment more than Four Months previous -Where personal property is attached, receipted for, restored to the defendant, and sold by
him to an innocent purchaser, and the defendant becomes' a bankrupt
before judgment, but more than four months after the attachment, the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment in rem, and his execution may be levied
upon the avails of the property when recovered from the receiptor:
.Batctelder v. Putnam, 54 N. H.
Assignment.for Creditors-InsolventLaws-Effect of Bankrupt Act.,
November 18th 1873, Albert Bow made a voluntary assignment for the
benefit of his creditors to Eli B. Rogers, the assignment being without
any preferences. Plaintiffs thereupon sued Bow and garnisheed Rogers.
They recovered judgment against the principal defendant. In the garnishee ease it appeared that the only property of Bow's that Rogers held
was that he had received by virtue of such assignment, and that his
only interest in this case was that of trustee under the assignment, and
that the value of the assigned property in his hands was greater than
the amount of the judgment against the principal defendant. The court
below held the assignment valid, and that the possession by Rogers of
the property in virtue thereof gave no right to plaintiffs as creditors of
Bow to maintain garnishee process against Rogers; and judgment was
rendered in Rogers's favor for costs. It is insisted that this commonlaw assignment, though otherwise unobjectionable, is rendered void by
the existence of the Federal Bankrupt Law. The argument is, that
the bankrupt law ipsofacto supersedes all state insolvent laws; that the
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common-law principles prevailing in this state on which voluntary as.
sigunients fir the benefit of creditors are based, and to which they owe
their legal efficacy, are a part of the state system regulating and governing in cases of insolvency, and are within the principle which causes a
bankrupt act. to work suspension of incompatible regulations, and hence
can have no force while such act exists. h1eld, That there is no proper
analogy between insolvent laws, correctly so called, and those principles
of common law which allow and sanction such an assignment, and no
such resemblance or relation as to warrant the conclusion that the Bankrupt Act suspends the latter as well as the former, and that in a state
at least where common-law assignments fior the benefit of creditors have
not been absorbed into or connected 'With the local insolvent laws, but
rest entirely upon common-law principles, they are not ipsofacto void:
simply because a bankrupt law is in foree, and in the absence of any
attempt to proceed under the Bankrupt Act: Cook et al. v. Rogers, S.
0. Mich.
Held, further, That the result of the proposition stated would be in
effect to make the Bankrupt Law operate to defeat an instrument intended and designed to square exactly with what has been held to be
the "'main purpose" of the act itself-namely, equal distribution of the
property of the debtorpro rata among his creditors; and that, too, at
the instance of parties who by the very proceeding itself in which the
claim is set up are aiming solely to defeat such main purpose and secure
to themselves present full satisfaction, without the slightest regard to the
equal claims of other creditors : Id.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Debtor and Creditor.
What estops Maker to deny Consideraton.-Where,at the request
of the party with whom he deals, one makes his promissory note (which
is to be a partial payment for a piece of work to be done for him) payable
to a third party, who is a creditor of the party with whom he contracts
for the work, and it is credited by the payee: to such party in good faith,
the maker cannot set up a failure of consideration, as between himself
and the party with whom he deals, in defence of a suit upon such note,
in the name of the payee: South Boston Iron Co. v. Brown. 63 Me.
The govwrning principle in this case is nqt distinguishable from that
which was laid down in Munroe v. Bordin, 65 E. C. L. R. 862 : Id.
CONDITION.
CONFEDERATE STATES.

See Grant.
See ConstitutionalLaw.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
-

War Powers-License to tradle with Eneray-Tax far such License.The government of the United States clearly has power to permit limited
commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war, and to impose
such conditions thereon as it sees fit; this power is incident to the
power to declare war and to carry it on to a successful termination:
Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall.
It seems that the President alone, who is constitutionally invested with
the entire charge of hostile operations, may exercise this power; but
whether so or not, there is no doubt that with the concurrent authority
of the Congress, he may exercise it according to his discretion : Id.
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The Ast of Congress of July 13th 1861 (12 Stat. at Large 257), prohibiting commercial intercourse with the insurrectionary states, but providing that the President might, in his discretion, license and permit it
in such articles, for such time, and by such persons, as he might think
most conducive to the public interest, to be conducted and carried on
only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of the Treasury, fully authorized the rules and regulations adopted
March 31st and September 11th 1863, whereby, amongst other things,
permission was given to purchase cotton in the insurrectionary stutes and
export the same to other states, upon condition of paying (besides other
fees) a the or bonus of tbur cents per pound : d.
The Act of July 2d 1864 (13 Stat. at Large 375), respecting commercial intercourse with the insurrectionary states, recognised and confirmed these regulations : Md.
The charge of four cents per pound required by these regulations was
not a tax, nor was it imposed in the exercise of the taxing power, but in
the exercise of the war power of the government. It was a condition
which the government, and the President, endued with powers theref,
iothe exercise of supreme and absolute control over the subject, had a
perfct right to impose: M4.
The condition thus imposed was entirely in the option of any person
to accept or not. If any did accept it, and engage in the trade, it was a
voluntary act, and all payments made in consequence were voluntary
payments, and, on that ground alone (if there were no other), could not
be recovered back : Id.
The Internal Revenue Acts of 1862 (12 Stat. at Large 405) and
]861 (13 Id. 15), in imposing specific duties by way of excise on cotton,
were not inconsistent with or repugnant to the charge in question. The
two charges were different things One was a payment as 'a condition
of trading at all, required by the war power ; the other was an excise
imposed by the taxing power: Id.
Nashville, though within the national military lines in 1863 and 1864,
was nevertheless hostile territory within the prohibition of commercial
intercourse, being within the terms of the President's proclamation on
that subject, which proclamation in that regard Was not inconsistent
with the Act of' July 13th 1861. properly construed : .11.
The civil war affected the status of the entire territory of the states
declared to be in insurrection, except as modified by declaratory acts
of' Congress or proclamations of the President: id.
Declaratory Act having Reference to Special Case.-An Act of Assembly enacted that no one should be eligible to the Councils of Philadelphia who at the time of his election held "office or employment"
under the state. A notary public was eleeted to the Councils. A quo
warranto to oust him was issued on the suggestion of private relators
pending which an act was passed declaring that the meaning of the first
act was not to prevent a member of Councils from holding the office of
notary public at the same time, and that no member of the present
Councils should be disqualified on account of being a notary public, nor
should lie be removed f'om the Councils for such disqualification: Ile",
That the latter act was constitutional : Hawkins v. The Commonwealth
ex rd., &c, 76 Pa.
0
The act simply modified the charter of a municipal corporation, over
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which the legislature has control, and did not interfere with any vested
right : 1d.
The act concerned the public, and did not interfere with the proper
functions of the court, nor override the judiciary : Id.
See Railroad.
CORPORATION.
Interest of C'editors-BormalDefects of Organization not a Bar.In an action by an insolvent corporation to collect an assessment fir the
purpose of paying their debts, the interests of the creditors will be so
thr regarded that no defence grounded on defects in the organization
of the corporation can be maintained, unless it could have been successfully set up in answer to a creditor's bill against the stockholders to
enfirce their personal liability : Ossipee Hos4ery and Woollen AL nrfcturing Co. v. Canney, 54 N. 11.
The plaintiffs' charter provided that the first meeting of the corporators might be called by publication at leastififteen days prior thereto.
Only fourteen days' notice of the meeting was given : 11 ld, that if
neither the.grantors of the charter (i. c., the state) nor the grantees

complained of the defect in the preliminary notice, the objection could
not subsequently be raised by a stockholder in a suit by the corporation
against him to recover an assessment made under the provision, chapter
136, section 4, General Statutes: Id.
A defucto organization of a corporation, formed and operated in good
faith, under color of the charter, is an organization under the charter,
within the meaning of the statute of 1846, eh. 321. sect. 7 : d.
In a suit brought against a stockholder to recover an assessment made
under the provisions of chapter 136, section 4. General Stuutes, lie
will be regarded as having waived the right to object that the whole
inumber of shares fixed and limited by the corporation was not subscribed for, if he has paid fbr the stock for which he subscribed : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Witness called by wrong .Name-Sufficiency of Indictmentfor iMurder.
witness in a capital case should not be excluded because the list
-A
of witnesses furnished to the respondent does not contain his true name,
if it contains the name by which he is known: State v. Burke, 54 N. I.
In an indictment for murder, a count which charges that the
respondent " in some way and manner, and by some means, instrument,
and weapon to the jurors unknown," killed and murdered the deceased,
is good: Id.
A general verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree being
returned on a trial under an indictment which contains several counts,
judgment will not be arrested, nor will the verdict be set aside, because
there is one count under which, bad there been no other, the jury could
not have fiund the respondent guilty of manslaughter in the first degree: Id.
Negative Averment-Burden of Proof.--Where the subject-matter
of a negative averment in an indictment relates to the respondent personally, or lies peculiarly within his knowledge, the averment will be
taken as true, unless disproved by him : State v. Keggon, 55 N. H.
Upon an indictment for a breach of the statute, prohibiting the sale
of spirituous liquors, alleging affirmatively that the respondent was not
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en agent for the sale of liquor, the state is not bound to prove the averment: d.
DAMAGES. See Master and Servant; Slander
Ii4ury ly Niegligence-Loss of Profits.-In an action by a passenger
for injury from collision on a railroad: Held, that evidence might be
given that one part of his business "was dealing in land, that he had a
quantity of land on hand, and to show the value of the business and
the profits arising therefrom :" Pennsylvania Railroad Company v.
Dae, 76 Pa.
The court charged: "If the plaintiff, at the time of the injury, was
engaged in a legitimate business from which pecuniary profits had
arisen, and future profits might reasonably be expected, which business
was interrupted or suspended in consequence of disabilities, physical or
mental, inflicted by the negligence of the defendant, the loss of such
anticipated profits is properly the subject of compensation in damages :" Ifeld to be correct: d.
Mere speculative profits are not to be considered ; damages in cases
of personal injury may be ascertained by the reduction of plaintiff's
earning powers, mental or physical, and therefore reference is to be had
to his business at the time of the accident : Id.
Probable Profits not a proper Basis.-In this case the defendant
covenanted to use all reasonable and proper diligence in the manufacture
and introduction into the market of a patented invention, and that he
would pay for said patent five thousand dollars from the net profits arising from the sale and manufacture thereof, as soon and as rapidly as
such profits shall be realized from said sale. For a breach of the former
covenant, the plaintiff would be entitled to at least nominal damages;
if he would recover more, the burden of proof is upon him to show the
amount: Winslow v. Lane, 63 Me.
JProbable profits are not a proper basis upon which to estimate damages,
and therefore, under the testimony as reported in this case, nominal
damages only can be recovered: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Bankruptcj; Bills and Notes.

Note on Time is Agreement for Delay, which is a sufficient Consideration--The taking of a promissory note for an antecedent debt, imposes
upon the creditor an obligation to wait for his pay till the note matures,
without any special agreement to that effect, or any understanding that
the debt shall be thereby extinguished; and the delay thus obtained is
a sufficient consideration for the note. Therefore, the note of a married
woman, given for the antecedent debt of her husband, is not void for
want of consideration, if it is made payable at a future day: Thompson
v. Gray, 63 Me.
ESTOPPEL.

See M.eclanic's Lien.

EVIDENCE. See Railroad; Slander.

Action.for Goods sold and refused to be Accepted- Cost Price.-In
an action of assumpsit for not accepting goods sold, it appeared that the
defendant agreed to take the goods and pay the plaintiff their cost for
the same; there was also evidence tending to show that he afterwards
VOL. XXIII.-58
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refused to perform his contract by accepting the goods : Held, that a
nonsoit could not be ordered even though there were no evidence as to
the co st of the goods: Watts v. Sawer, 55 !N. 1-.
Evidence of the value of goods is admissible on the question of their
cost: Id.
Whether a memorandum, which a witness knew when it was made to
be correct, can go to the jury as evidence, depends upon whether the
witness, after examining it, is able to state the fact from memory: Id.
When, Secondary is Adrnissible-Cop/.-Tlie burden is upon the
plaintiff to prove that neither of duplicate bills 'of lading can be produced, before introducing parol testimony of the eGtents. If le offers
the latter, and it is received, the presumption is that he satisfied the
court of his inability to procure either part; which presumption is not
overcome by the fact that the defendant, a shipmaster, delivered his
part to one of his owners at the end of the voyage, ten years before:
Dyer v. Freerick., 63 Me
[f the plaintiff thinks this copy is still iniexistence, it is his duty to
sumni on the owner to produedit ; if he does not do so, he cannot except
to tl e introduction by the defence of parol testimony of its contents, to
rebut like evidence introduced by himself: Id.
FIXTURE.

Jacineey-Sles of PersonalPropert/-Deerl.-OnMay 29th 1967,
Kau man owned certain lands, on which a building had been erected
into which machinery for the manufacture of wool had been put and
annexed in a substantial manner. This machinery was owned by
Haidy. Kaufian conveyed an undivided fourth of the real estate to
"[ardy, who sold to Kaufman an undivided half of the machinery.
January 29th 1868, Kaufman sold an undivided fourth of the real estate
together with his half of the machinery to one Kinney. August 25th
18i8, Hardy sold to Kinney, deeding one-fourth of the real estate and
delivering possession. On this sale Kinney gave Hardy a purchaseprice mortgage on the undivided half of the real estate. The nmachinery was not mentioned in this mortgage. Lee became purchaser upon
foreclosure of this mortgage, and claims that the mortgage covered the
machinery as fixtures. Adams asserts a right to the machinery by a
purchase of it as personal property firom Kinney previous to the foreclosure. The court below sustained Lee's claim, and Adams brings
error. Held, That this ruling was erroneous; that at no time has there
been unity of ownership of the land and the machinery put into the
building; and that the fact that all the time the various parties have
had title to the machinery distinct from their title to the land, is of itself conclusive that the machinery was personalty; that when the
ownership of the land is in one person and of the thing affixed to it is
in another, and in its nature is capable of severance without injury to
the former, the latter cannot in contemplation of law become a part of
the former, but must necessarily remain distinct property, to be used
and dealt with as personal estate only ; and that a thing cannot as to all
undivided interest therein be real estate, and as to another undivided
interest be personalty : Adams v. Lee., S. Q. Mich.
Lee, claiming that if the machinery continued to b personal estate
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after being put up in the building, Adams was nevertheless a wrongdoer in t.'king it out of the building, because, if personalty, the title to
it was never transfbrred by any of the conveyances of interests in the
land, has procured assignments from Kaufman & Hardy of any right of
actiou they, as owners of the machinery, might have against Adams for
taking it away. But these assignments were made after Kaufman &
Hardy, as the evidence clearly showed, had sold their right to the machinery to Kinney. Hreld, That the failure to mention the machinery
in the deeds was of no importance; that no writing was requisite to
transfer the title to this any more than to any other personalty : P.
'lhe query is suggested, but not decided, whether Lee, on his own
theory or the case, had any cause of action, the machinery having been
taken off the premises before he became purchaser at the foreclosure
sale: 1d.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

Suit on J'udgment of Another State.-In a suit upon a judgment of a
sister state, objections to the frirm and sufficiency of the evidence offered
to prove the record on which the action is brought cannot be sustained:
Maxwell v. Stewart, 21 Wall.
Nor is it a valid objection against the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment that the record shows that the 'cause was tried
without the intervention of a jury, and did not show that a jury had
been waived as provided by statute: P1.
GRANT.

Statutory Grant by Government- Condition Subsequent.-Unless
there are 'clauses in a statute restraining the operation of words of present grant, these must be taken in their natural sense to import an immediate transfer of title, although subsequent proceedings may be
required to give precision to that title and attach it to specific tracts.
No individual can call in question the validity of the proceedings by
which precision is thus given to the title where the United States are
satisfied with them: Schukenberg v. Rarriman,21 Wall.
No one can take advantage of the non-performance of a condition
subsequent annexed to an estate in fee, but the grantor or his heirs or
suecessors, and if they do not see fit to assert their right to enforce a
fbrfeiture on that ground, the title remains unimpaired in the grantee.
The rule equally obtains where the grant upon condition proceeds from
the government: Id.
The manner in which the reserved right of the grantor for breach of
the condition must be asserted so as to restore the estate, depends upon
the character of the grant. If it be a private grant, that right must be
asserted by entry or its equivalent. If the grant be a public one, the
right must be asserted by judicial proceedings authorized by law, or
there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the property
for breach of the condition, such as an act directing the possession and
appropriation of the property, or that it be offered for sale or settlement: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Debtor and Creditor.
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INSURANCE.
Declaration-Foreign Company- Transitoa2: Action -Conditions.This was an action brought by defendants in error on an insurance
policy fbr a loss-by fire. The plaintiffs below recoveied judgment, and
the insurance company brings error. The suit, was commenced by declaration counting specially upon the policy, and the plea was the general issue with notice of special matter, but no affidavit den)ing the
execution of the policy was filed. On the trial, the defendant objected
to the introduction of the policy on the grounds: 1. That the declaration counted on a policy made by a corporation foruied and existing
under the laws of Kentucky, and the execution of the policy had not
been proved; 2. Because no proof had been given of authority of the
company to do business in this state; 3. That the policy did not appear
to have been made in Bay county, but in Illinois. fhid, 1. That the
law is distinctly settled by our own decisions against the ground first
stated. Hed, 2. That it was not admissible for the cnnpany to insist
upon a preliminary express showing by its contractee that in insuring
it acted honestly and where it was lawful for it to act; but that it would
be presumed, certainly as against itself, in the absence of contrary proof,
that in making the insurance it acted at a place where it would not be
unlawful or in bad fitth to act. Held, 3. That as to the third ground
of objection, wherever the contract was made, the right to sue upon it
was transitory and not local ; and that the stitement in the declaration
under a videlicet that the contract was made at Bay City, &c., very evidently could not have misled or surprised defendant; and that the ruling
of the court upon this point afforded no cause for complaint : Clay ire
and Murine Insurance Co. v. Huron, Salt and Lumber Afanufacturing
Co. et al., S. C. Mich.
The defence offered to show that the plaintiff had contracted in writing
to sell the premises insured to one Babcock, who had paid the full
purchase-price, but this offer was rejected. The policy provided among
other things that "if the assured is not the sole and unconditional owner
of the property insured, or (if' said property be a building or buildings)
of the land on which said building or buildings stand, by a sole, unconditional and entire ownership and title, and is not so expressed in the
written portion of the policy," then the policy should be void. The
only- statement of ownership in the policy was the use of the word
"their" before the description of property. field, That this statement
of ownership as "their" property, taken in connection with the clause
requiring it to be stated, if true, that it was not their property by entire
ownership and title, &c., makes the policy import that the insured was,
not merely owner, but owner by a sole, unconditional and entire ownership and title; that if Babcock had such an equitable title as was offered
to be shown, then the plaintiff could not have had such sole and entire
ownership and title as the policy represented, and that in that event
the policy by its own terms would be made ineffectual, and the plaintiff
could not recover; and that the rejectuient of this proffered evidence
was erroneous: Id.
The policy by its terms made the loss, if any. payable to George C.
Smith, as his interest might appear. The declaration was in the name
of the plaintiff, "for the use and benefit of George C. Smith." It was
objected that no recovery could be had without proof of some legal or
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equitable interest in him. Rel , That as the proofs showed no interest
in any one but the plaintiff, and the insurance was made with the plaintiff. and not with Siith, the point was not well taken ; that the clause
directing payment to Smith. &c., was intended merely as a mode of appointing that paynent should be made to him to the extent of some
claim he had or was expected to have against the assured, and that a
paymen to him, consistently and in accordanec with his claim against
the assured, would be a payment to the assured, but that the right of
the assured was not intended to be made conditional upon Smith's having
ionic interest or claim : N.
The detence sought to show that when the insurance was effected,
and when the loss occurred, the insurance company had not complied
with our laws prescribing the terms on which foreign companies may do
business in, this state, and insisted that this would render the policy invalid. i1,id. That as the contract of insurance purported to have been
made in another state, and the defenee explicitly assumed such to
be tie faet, and as the contract was a personal one and not local, or
necessarily to be perlriied in this state, our insurance laws did not
aftfet it, and that the point was not maintainable; that it is questionable whether the point would be a good one even if the contract had
been shown to be a Miehigan contract, whether such a defence would not
be excluded as an attempt by the company to take advantage of its own
wrong, and whether our statute was ever intended to make void, at the
election of the insurer, such insurances as they may succeed in effecting
here in violation of it: Id.
INTOXICATING

LiQUORS.

See Criminal Law.

JUDGMENT.

Assignment on the Pi'cord-ColflctingAssignments.-S. made a note
with warrant of attorney to J. on which judgment was entered ; J.
borrowed money from F. and delivered him the note as collateral security; the judgment was not marked to F.'s use on the record. J. afterwards borrowed money from N., and by writing assigned the judgment
to him; the assignment was noted on the record of the judgment. In
the distribution of the proceeds of sale by the sheriff of the property
of S. : Ieb. that N. was entitled to the auouit of the judgment : .raley's Aqeal, 76 Pa.
An instrument on which judgment has been entered by the prothonotary, under the Act of February 24th 1806, should not be delivered to
the plaintiff; the practice should be abolished : Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Alloicance of Rent in Bankrupt Estatc-Preference.-Execut ion was
issued and delivered to the sheriff July 2d; proceedings in bankruptcy
commenced on defondant's application July 26th, and he was adjudged
a bankrupt the same day; the sheriff levied July 29th, and same day
the landlord of defendant gave notice that he claimed his rent from the
proceeds of sale: Held, that he was entitled in preference to the
assignee in bankruptcy: Barnes's Appeal, 76 Pa.
The rent is a prior charge under the Act of June 16th 1836 (Execution), and the execution is for the benefit of the landlord : Id.
over the assignee in
Whenever an execution will carry a valid saleId.
for rent:
bankruptcy, it carries with it tie claim
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LIEN.

See Bailment; Mechanic's Lien.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Liability of Servant to Master for Consequence of Misconulct--1ractice.-A servant is liable to an action at the suit of his master, when a
third person has brought an action and recovered damages against the
master for injuries sustained in consequence of the servant's negligence
or misconduct: Grand T'Iruik Rtilway Co. v. Latham, Adm'r., 63 Me.
The servant is liable for the costs and counsel fees in such suit,
incurred in the defence, he having been notified of its pendency, and
having requested his master to defend : Id.
MECHANIC'S

LIEN.

Loss of Lien by Time-Estoppel.-A mechanic's lien was filed November 14th 1865; scire facias issued against contractor and owner
March 16th 1866; verdict for plaintiff April 6th 1870, new trial
granted; plea October 7th 1871, that five years had elapsed since entry
of lien ; replication, that continuances were obtained by defendant and
that the delay was by their acts, and not by default of plaintiffs. On
demurrer to the replication that judgment had not been obtained within
five years from the issuing of the writ, Held, that the lien was gone and
judgment was properly entered for defendants: Hunter et al.v. Lanniny
et al., 76 Pa.
A debt may survive when the lien is gone, and an estoppel to prevent
the denial of the debt will not keep the lien alive : Id.
The proceeding on a mechanic's lien being in. rem the lien must appear by the record, and not by outside acts of estoppel : Id.
An owner cannot be prejudiced by continuing the debt against the
contractor : Id.
PRACTICE.

0bjections at Trial.-When objections to the reading of a deposition
made while a trial is in progress do not go to the testimony of the witness, but relate to defects which might have been obviated by retaking
the deposition, the objections will not be sustained ; no notice having
been given beforehand to opposing counsel that they would be made:
Doane v. Glenn, 21 Wall.
Such objections, if meant to be insisted on at the trial, should be
made and noted when the deposition is taking, or be presented afterwards by a motion to suppress it. Otherwise they will be considered as
waived: 11.
PUBLIC LANDS. See Grant; Timber.
RAILROAD.

See Damages.

Expulsion of Passenger-Right to retain Ticket after CancelationRemoval of Causes--In an pplication for the removal of a case in
by Pa.
an agent or
may be made
which a corporation is a party, the affidavitRailroad
Co., 76
employee: Van kirk v. The Pennsylania
A passenger purchased a railroad ticket from N. to W., and fode on
it to M., an intermediate point; the ticket, under the rules of the conipany, was cancelled for the whole route; he voluntarily left the train at
M. Subsequently he offered the ticket for his passage from A to W
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the conductor took up the ticket, refused to allow him to ride, and
ordered hiiii to leave the train, which he did. In a suit by the passenger agai,,st the railroad company, the court rejected evidence by
the plaintiff that he offered to pay his fire, if the conductor would
return the ticket, which was refused, to be fbllowed by evidence that ill
claiming to ride he had acted in good lhith upon information by a ticket
agent, froin whom 1e had previously purchased the ticket, that he had a
riglht to ride onl it. Held to be error : ]d.
. By denying plaintiff's right to ride on the ticket, the conductor
waivel ill riglht to retain it; the plaintiff might have retained the
ticket : d.
The declarations of the ticket agent, made days after selling the
ticket., although not evidence to establish a contract with the plaintiff,
were evidence to show that plaintiff in good faith claimed a right to ride
on the ticket: 14.
Evidence that the conductor allowed plaintiff to ride past several
statimos after leaving M., and ejected him at a place remote from shelter,
in a storm, &c., was proper for the jury in considering whether the conductor selected such place intentionally: Id.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

See Railroad; Trust.

Suit in State Court between Citizens of same State.-A suit in a state
court against several defendants, in which the plaintiff and certain of
the dethndants are citizens of the same state, and the remaining defendants citizens of other states, cannot be removed to the Circuit Court
under the Act of March 2d 1867 : Vannevar v. Bryant, 21 Wall.
Nor if' the plaintiff was a citizen of one state atd the defendants all
citizens of one other state, could such removal be made wih~re one trial
has been had and a motion for a new trial is yet pending and undisposed
of. To authorize a removal under the above-mentioned act, the action
must, at the time of the application for removal, be actually pending
fbr trial: Id.
REPLEVTN.

See Timber.

31ay be maintained without Demand against one having no Title.No previous demand upon a bond fide purchaser of a chattel from one
who had no authority to sell it is necessary to enable the true owner to
maintain replevin : Prime v. Cobb, 63 le.
Such purchaser is not lawfully in possession as against the owner: Id.
SLANDER.

Damages-Defendant's Weath.-In an action of slander, evidence as
to the reputation of the defendant for wealth is admissible; but it seems
it should be proved by general reputation, rather than by particular
facts: Stanwood v. Whitmore, 63 Me.
STATUTE.

See Grant.

TIMBER.

Cut by Trespasser does not change Title-Alixture of Property-Repietin.-Where the title to land remains in the state, timber cut upon
the land belongs to the state. Whilst the timber is standing it constitutes a part of the realty; being severed from the soil, its character is
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changed ; it becomes personalty, but its title is not affected; it continues
as previously the property of the owner of the land, and can be pursued
wherever it is carried. All the remedies are open to the owner which
the law affords in other cases of the wrongful removal or conversion of
personal property: Schulenberg v. Harriman,21 Wall.
Where logs cut from the lands of the state without license have been
intermingled with logs cut from other lands, so as not to be distinguishable, the state is entitled, under the law of Minnesota, to replevy an
equal amount from the whole mass. The remedy afforded by the law
of Minnesota in such case held to be just in its operation and less severe
than that which the common law would authorize: Id.
Where, in an action of replevin, the complaint alleges property and
right of possession in the plaintiffs, and the answer traverses directly
these allegations, under the issue thus formed any evidence is admissible
on the part of the defendant which goes to show that the plaintiffs
have neither property nor right of possession. Evidence of title in a
stranger is admissible: Id.
TRUST.
Failure of Trustee to give Bond as required by Statute.-Though
statute may enact that a trustee to whom property is assigned in trust
for any person, "before entering upon the discharge of his duty, shall
give bond" for the faithful discharge of his duties, his omission to give
such bond does not divest the trustee of a legal estate once regularly
conveyed to him: Gardner v. Brown, 21 Wall.
Accordingly, when A., of one state, mortgages by way of trust-deed
to B., of another, lands in that other in trust for C., of this same other
state, authorizing B.,upon default in the payment of the mortgage-debt,
to take possession of the mortgaged premises and sell them upon certain
specified conditions, B. is a necessary party in any proceedings in the
nature of foreclosure; though by statute of the state, B. may have been
required to give bond such as above mentioned, and may not have given
it. And if C., the creditor, have filed a bill for foreclosure against A.
and B., A. cannot transfer the case from the state court to the Circuit
Court, under the Act of July 27th 1866. The suit is not one in which
there can be a final determination of the controversy, so far as it concerns him, without the presence of B., to whom the trust-deed was
made: 1d.
USAGE.
-

lrizst not be repugnant to Contract or Law.-When a shipper and a
carrier of goods have entered into a valid contract, the one to load the
other's vessel with a cargo of coal, at a specified port, and to pay freight
at a certain rate per ton, and the other to carry such cargo to the place
of contract for that price, a practice among persons engaged in that
kind of business at such place of contract, to treat such contract as
binding upon the parties only as might suit the convenience of either
of them, cannot be upheld as a commercial usage to affect such written
contract, because of its repugnancy thereto and to the principles of
law: Randall et al. v. Smith, 63 Me.
In order that a contract may be regarded as having been made with
reference to a usage of trade, such usage must be certain, general,
known, reasonable and not repugnant to the contract or the rules of
law: -1d.

